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The Increasing Precariousness of the
Employment Society: Driving Force
for a New Right Wing Populism? 
Klaus Dörre, Klaus Kraemer, Frederic Speidel 
The text deals with the relations between the precariousness of employ-
ment relations and right-wing populist orientations. On the basis of  
qualitative empirical material it sketches a right-wing populist system of 
axioms that – if it is consolidated – can also structure labour experiences. 
The article explains that these orientations can exist in all zones of  
the “employment society”. In connection with this, it discusses the  
explanatory potential of different theoretical approaches. 
Key words: Precariousness, right wing populism, integration,  
employment society, everyday consciousness, political orientation,  
subjective interpretations 
Employment societies of the Western European “atlantic” or “co-operative” 
capitalisms have been undergoing transformation. They face a phenomenon 
well-known to the more market-driven “un-coordinated” Anglo-Saxon forms 
of capitalism: the increase in insecure, unprotected modes of employment 
which do not guarantee long-term wellbeing. Social scientists like Robert 
Castel (2005: 54ff.) speak of the “return of insecurity” in rich Western socie-
ties. Although “these societies enjoy the protection of security systems” the 
fear of “insecurity is omnipresent” (ibid.: 8). This increasing insecurity is 
provoked by fault lines in the labour market. The link between wage earning 
employment and strong social rights is being eroded. Due to a flexible work-
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ing régime and the weakening of collective regulation, current “financial 
market capitalism” (Windolf 2005) represents the recommodification of la-
bour (Castel 2000; Hyman 2001; Dörre et al. 2005). This is taking place in 
different countries at different times; “institutional filters” of national capital-
isms influence it, but cannot stop it. Post-Fordist employment societies are 
divided into three “zones”. The “zone of disaffiliation”, relatively small in 
Germany, contains the long-term unemployed. The regularly, full-time em-
ployed belong to the ”zone of integration“. Above 60 % of all German em-
ployees are located in this zone (Brinkmann et al. 2006). In between is a 
growing ”zone of precariousness“, with heterogeneous employment modes 
like temporary work, fixed-term contract work, forced part-time work, little 
jobs, badly paid jobs, state-subsidised jobs (“one-euro-jobs”) and unpaid 
practical trainees. These jobs do not provide long term security, and are pre-
carious.
This hypothesis has been developed by Robert Castel in “Transformation 
of the Social Question”, based on French society, He probed the influence of 
precariousness on political attitudes. The “return of insecurity” is a driving 
force for a “Poujadist reaction”, a model of right-wing populism based on ri-
valry between those faced with exclusion from the labour market, fuelled by 
resentment: “It is a reaction of groups located at the lower end of the social 
ladder who are in a situation of deprivation and who are competing with other 
equally or even more deprived members of society... They search for reasons 
to understand their situation and pretend to be superior with the help of xeno-
phobia and racist discrimination” (Castel 2005: 73f.).  
Castel has provoked debate. In our recent study we applied these hypothe-
ses to Germany, and  saw the effects of precariousness on the quality of inte-
gration. We identified modes of dealing with precariousness politically, and 
possible transitions towards right-wing populist orientations. Current right-
wing populism manifests itself in the every-day-consciousness of employees. 
Precariousness furnishes the “raw material”, enabling political reaction to be 
synthesised into right-wing populist orientations.  
Contrary to conventional questionnaire-based research, identifying conti-
nuities and developments of right-wing extremist potentials using approved 
questioning strategies, we assumed complex interrelated processes, for which 
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appropriate empirical indicators are still to be developed. Contemporary 
right-wing populism is a politically virulent anti-democratic and anti-
egalitarian current. It is not anti-modernistic. Often, right-wing populism suc-
ceeds in a globalised world in re-discussing the social question as a national 
one, compromising traditional political élites, seen as being unable to do a 
good job. Right-wing populist formations refer to modes of perceptions, val-
ues and interests which recently would have been considered as the “welfare 
state-consciousness” of social democratic employees with trade union mem-
bership. Such transformations can occur with crucial deficits of representa-
tion within the political system. Populist currents have their origins in the cri-
sis of the political system (Priester 2005). Populist formations result from the 
erosion of other political options.  They may not transform into proper politi-
cal parties, but can evolve within established parties or trade unions. It is dif-
ficult to identify such currents from a scientific perspective.  
Right-wing populist orientations have to be treated as a multidimensional 
construct (Hall 1986) that combines idea systems and pseudo scientific po-
litical philosophies with explicit political judgements and interpretations, also 
with implicit attitudes and schemes of action and interpretation. Traditional 
questionnaire research rasps one dimension, linked with explicit political 
statements detected by using a questionnaire. The underlying sense is not 
identifiable through survey methods. Pierre Bourdieu differentiates three 
modes of constitution of political opinions and orientations: “class ethos”, 
“systematic political conception” and “second degree decisions”. Social ethos 
has a subconsciously rooted spontaneous relationship with politics. The “sys-
tematic political conception” is a system of “explicit political principles” 
which stands for a mode of “political axiomatic”. Finally, “second degree de-
cisions” stand for the adaptation of political positions to the concept of a po-
litical party or other politically relevant organisations. The last two modes 
make each political judgement explicit. When “producing” a political judge-
ment, every individual refers to all three modes. Social ethos compensates for 
inadequacies of the political axiomatic (Bourdieu 1988: 655-89). All three 
modes influence the everyday consciousness. The orientating function of 
spontaneous opinions, emotions and stereotypes becomes more important, the 
less coherent the political axiomatic of everyday consciousness.  
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There is relative autonomy between work consciousness and political ori-
entations: no direct causal connection between actual work experiences, and 
politically relevant perceptions. Basic elements of political consciousness de-
velop in socialisation which often lacks concrete work experiences (Baethge 
et al. 1989; Dörre 1992). Political consciousness is neither determined nor 
structured by work experiences (Offe 1984). Earlier studies showed the 
autonomy of solidly rooted political orientations, questioned and influenced 
only in particular situations, making explanations obsolete. Neither unem-
ployment nor precariousness culminate automatically in xenophobic or ag-
gressively nationalistic orientations.  
Employment is not irrelevant in explaining new right-wing populism. 
More recent studies (Flecker/Hentges 2004: 119 ff., Flecker 2004, Flecker/ 
Krenn 2004) show a “populist gap”, resulting from the ignorance of employ-
ment related problems by the political system. Populist potential has been 
identified by Robert Castel within the “zone of integration” among groups 
and individuals who can lose something, who aim to defend the privilege of 
“normal employment”. Bourdieu sees potential for right-wing populist orien-
tation among groups who consider precariousness and social exclusion as so-
cial neighbours aiming at distinction. The common denominator is distance 
from a simplistic winner-loser semantic. Connections between work experi-
ences, synthesising interpretations and right-wing populist orientations are 
more difficult to understand.  
We have analyzed connections between experiences of precariousness and 
right-wing populist orientations, with an explorative study, using 100 semi-
structured interviews with employees from different sectors, and unemployed 
persons. We also undertook 30 expert interviews with managers, works 
councils and trade unionists..
1.  Precariousness and social (dis-)integration – typical outcomes 
Our study shows, in accordance with other recent examinations (Baethge et 
al. 2005; Schultheis/Schulz 2005), the development of a “zone of precarioun-
ess” in Germany. This is obvious in the experiences and subjective employ-
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ment orientations of our interviewees. We distinguish between nine different 
types of employment-related (dis-)integration. 
Table 1:  Employment-related potentials of (dis-)integration – a typology 
Zone of Integration 
1. Secure integration (“The safe ones”) 
2. Atypical integration (“The unconventionals” or “self-managers”)
3. Insecure integration (“The destabilised”) 
4. Endangered integration (“Those in fear of social falling”) 
Zone of Precariousness 
5. Precarious employment as a chance / temporary integration (“The hopeful ones”) 
6. Precarious employment as an involuntary arrangement (“The realistic ones”) 
7. Bearable precariousness (“The content ones”) 
Zone of Disaffiliation 
8. Surmountable exclusion (“Those trying hard”) 
9. Controlled exclusion / pseudo-integration (“The quasi-excluded”)
We focus on the (dis-)integration paradox of post-Fordist societies. Processes 
and fears of precariousness can be observed in the “zone of integration”, due 
to real facts such as collective redundancies or the closure of plants (type 4), 
or fear of social falling resulting from insecurity in deteriorating working 
conditions, such as the informal undermining of collective bargaining stan-
dards. The paradox means that attempts at reintegration into the “normal” la-
bour market take place in the “zone of precariousness”, based on “secondary 
integration potential”. Integration results neither from a permanent employ-
ment with a decent salary (labour force perspective), nor from identification 
with the concrete activity, providing neither personal satisfaction nor social 
recognition (work activity perspective). It results from the hope of a job in 
the “zone of integration” (type 5 and 8), or compounding with precariousness 
and partial exclusion, made bearable by the revalorization of gender specific 
(type 7) or ethnically based (type 9) mechanisms of integration.  
Integration has different meanings and functions, depending on the situa-
tion. Precariousness does not automatically mean total poverty and social iso-
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lation. Precarious employees find themselves in a particularly “fluid state” 
(Kraemer/Speidel 2004: 119ff.). Social climbing to the “zone of integration” 
seems realistic; they mobilise their resources and energies to become a per-
manent employee, working to prevent social decline. Precarious workers lack 
phases of rest and partial security. They are the first to be threatened with 
dismissal. Most have to do more boring jobs. They are the stopgaps, the 
“general servants” whose material and qualification resources become less 
applicable, the longer employment insecurity lasts.  
The exhausting “fluid state” makes precarious employees vulnerable. The 
old promise of welfare state-capitalism, that “normal employment” consti-
tutes the basis for participation in rising wealth, has become obsolete. 
Integration in the “zone of precariousness” means something different to 
precarious employees compared with “normal employees”. As precarious 
employees often work together with “normal employees”, they are a constant 
warning symbol. Permanent employees who first see temporary workers as a 
welcome “flexibility buffer” may fear that they will become replaceable. 
Their job is done by employees with financial and social conditions which 
would never be accepted by core workers. Although temporary or fixed-term 
contract workers are a small minority in big companies, they discipline core 
workers, even members of a trade union. In firms with highly qualified 
knowledge workers, freelancers have a similar effect: short working weeks, 
combined with long daily working hours, pressurise colleagues with perma-
nent status to work equally long daily hours. In construction, Polish 
temporary employees force permanent employees to accept salary and 
working time conditions undermining collective bargaining standards (type 
3). Core and flexible employees are connected, making permanent, full-time 
employment worth defending.  
Increasing insecure employment encourages the “destabilisation of the 
stabilised” (Castel 2000: 357). By disciplining and withdrawing resistance 
from employees, insecure employment encourages the “stabilisation of insta-
bility”. Precariousness is not marginal, but has a disintegrative effect. It con-
stitutes a power and control system, which creates pressure on formally inte-
grated units. Differentiation between “modernity winners and losers” does 
not apply.  
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2.  Transitions towards right-wing populist orientations –  
eight central topics 
We looked at individual interpretations of problems in public discourse. The 
questions in an open form concerned: general political interest, globalisation, 
welfare state reforms, EU-enlargement, EU-candidature of Turkey, green-
card debate, attitude towards the political system, party preferences, percep-
tions of right-wing populist parties in Europe, attitudes towards trade unions 
and employee representation, national identity, cultural differences and prob-
lems of integration of immigrants. 
Interview analysis looked at hints indicating xenophobic, racist, authori-
tarian, anti-democratic or anti-egalitarian attitudes. Among approximately 30 
persons interviewed, we identified eight topics, which operate as “subjective 
bridges” towards right-wing populism. These topics are: 
Table 2:  Indicators of right-wing populist “everyday-philosophies” 
(1) “Immigration destroys the German culture and has to be stopped“ 
(2) “Immigration destroys the German culture and has to be stopped“ 
(3) “When saving, then we have to save money with regard to the parasites of the welfare state“ 
(4) “German history must not be a burden any longer“ 
(5) “We would like to be proud of Germany, but we can’t“ 
(6) ”Politicians are gangsters; the entire system has to be changed“ 
(7) “A bit less democracy can do no harm“ 
(8) “Right-wing extremist parties are too extreme, but are talking about the right issues” 
(1) “Immigration destroys the German culture and has to be stopped“ 
The rejection of further immigration is the lowest common denominator of a 
modern right-wing populist philosophy. Usually the rejection of immigration 
correlates with the emphasis of “not being hostile towards foreigners”, of 
“not being a racist”. Individuals add that they have contact with foreigners. 
Interviewees in all three zones feel that further immigration, mainly in big 
cities, might lead to the disappearance of “German culture”, characteristics 
such as continuity or assiduity, and the fact that the Germans rebuilt their 
country after the Second World War. “One is proud to be part of it, to have 
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contributed.” Cultural “mixture” endangers not only virtues which enabled 
Germany’s economic rise, but also the individual identity which relies on the 
power of national culture. Immigration appears to be an attack on one’s own 
national identity. Immigrants are then seen as “useless”, “undesired” and “not 
willing to work” who could “enter” Germany through “foreigner and asylum 
law”.
(2) “Foreigners take away employment from the Germans“ 
In addition to rejection of foreigners, we had arguments from an economic 
perspective. Foreigners are competitors on the labour market. Eeconomic re-
jection refers to immigrants who are perceived as real competitors. The fear 
of losing a job leads to the claim that we should “first take into consideration 
the interests of our country”. The relationship between foreigners and non-
foreigners is a fight over distribution with winners and losers. The conse-
quences are obvious: The enlargement of the EU is rejected, with EU-
membership of Turkey; processes of economic globalisation are primarily 
perceived as a threat, the introduction of the green-card as the attempt to 
compensate for “what the industry (through lacking qualification) has messed 
up”.
(3) ”When savings, we have to save money with regard to the parasites of the 
welfare state“ 
Protecting decreasing wealth against illegitimate claims is seen in the context 
of labour market competition; also with regard to the welfare state and wel-
fare state reforms. If savings have to be made they must not be with regard to 
the performers, but with those who take advantage of the welfare state. The 
construction of an “in-group” willing to work and an “out-group” of parasites 
refers not only to foreigners. It also refers to “lazy unemployed”, homeless, 
beggars or German recipients of social assistance. The rejection of “social 
parasites” goes with a damaged sense of justice, especially if those unwilling 
to perform are wealthy. The chances of improving justice through the privi-
leged parts are slight. Instead the focus is put on weaker groups. While fight-
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ing against “social parasites”, it is legitimate to refer to right-wing populist 
parties.
(4) “German history must not be a burden any longer“ 
Many interviewees feel disadvantaged in their own country, in the “zone of 
integration” as well the “zone of precariousness”. Freelancers in the IT indus-
try, as well as saleswomen in retail trade, have a common opinion: Germans 
disadvantage their own population. Young Turkish unemployed understand 
that Germans aim to be the leaders in their country. Germans are disadvan-
taged by the historical burden that prevents Germans from making claims to-
wards non-Germans in an open manner. An IT expert working as a freelancer 
leaves no doubt: “Due to the history of Germany, one has to be careful not to 
become too extreme with the words ‘national’, ‘identity’, ‘Germany’ etc. (...). 
But, for a long time, one might have the feeling that the political sphere has 
higher demands of Germans than of foreigners”. Overcoming this historical 
burden is a precondition for coping with the lack of respect from foreigners. 
Those who acknowledge their “German identity”, and are proud of being 
German, will no longer be seen as Nazis. Only then can Germans ask for-
eigners to adapt to the culture of the majority (German culture) without self-
stigmatisation.  
(5) “We would like to be proud of Germany, but we can’t“ 
Overcoming history is a precondition for constructing a national identity with 
a self-stabilising function. Where we find transitions towards right-wing 
populist orientations, national identity is important. One would like to be 
proud to be German. National identity is constructed in different ways. Some 
associate national identity with economic power, others with a familiar envi-
ronment, habits or cultural specifics. Others are proud “to be willing to help”, 
“as Germans to help all the others”. This identity construct has nothing in 
common with a traditional “blood-and-soil”-nationalism. These constructs 
become problematic if they are pronounced together with aims which refer to 
non-Germans in an aggressive manner. National pride implies priority for 
“German interests”. Even the positive recognition of helping others is formu-
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lated as: “We should not forget ourselves as Germans. Above all, we are im-
portant”. Particularly in the eyes of interviewees from eastern Germany, na-
tional identity is a symbol for the right to a decent life. They consider their 
national pride blocked. . They would like to be proud of their German iden-
tity, but they can’t.  
(6) “Politicians are gangsters; the entire system has to be changed“ 
The politicians are scapegoats. Among well-bred employees judgements are 
differentiated. Most heavily criticised are the inability to find adequate solu-
tions and arrogance within politics. The lower the position in the hierarchy, 
the harsher the judgements. Those threatened with social decline and precari-
ous employees consider the entire “system” as corrupt. Politicians are seen as 
an over-paid, corrupt caste, ignoring legitimate claims of “the population”. 
The politicians are a group where money should be saved. The political class 
is compared with “social parasites” and foreigners not willing to adapt to the 
German culture. Some interviewees even see some politicians as “gangsters”.  
(7) “A bit less democracy can do no harm“ 
Doubts on the integrity of the political class merge into a critique of the po-
litical system. This critique seems moderate. A production worker speaks 
about “politicians in Germany” as “rather lazy”. This is due “to our political 
system, where we have constant elections”. Democratic procedures are seen 
as inefficient and expensive. This critique can have an openly authoritarian 
character, with a call for harsher prosecution of foreigners, their expulsion 
from Germany or the vigorous fight against criminality. Criminality is the
topic where politics should prove its credibility. An extreme position is that 
those who have become criminal should be put into a labour camp: “Working 
them to death so that in the evening they are unable to do anything. This is 
how the Americans treat their criminals”. Such authoritarian orientations do 
not lead to an open claim for a different political system beyond party-
democracy. For some the possibility of such a development seems realistic. 
Some interviewees see the possibility that history could be repeated. “There 
are hard times” and also “Hitler benefited from high unemployment” can be 
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heard, with other historical references. Employees from eastern Germany 
compare their current situation and the situation before the fall of the Berlin 
Wall: “If the unemployment situation doesn’t improve we will have a situa-
tion like in the past. We know this kind of situation from our experiences in 
the GDR”.
(8) “Right-wing extremist parties are too extreme, but are talking about the 
right issues” 
It is in this context that the opinions about right-wing extremist parties have 
to be seen. No one within our sample openly admits being a partisan of a 
right-wing populist or extremist formation. The employees are politically 
“average people”. The majority vote for the CDU and SPD, some of them ab-
stain from voting. The interviewed employees associate a positive function 
with right-wing populist or extremist formations. The lowest common de-
nominator between the interviewees is that although such parties are too ex-
treme, and without influence, they can raise awareness of the right topics. 
Most employees acknowledge that rightist formations identify relevant ques-
tions and problems. The rejection of such formations is because they repre-
sent extremist groups. There is not much confidence that these formations are 
capable of initiating real changes. Employees feel that unemployment, immi-
gration and the destruction of “German identity” can only be stopped by fun-
damental changes. Their rejection of right-wing populist or extremist forma-
tions is based upon very weak foundations, and it seems obvious that some 
vote for the NPD (party of the extreme right in Germany) or other extremist 
right-wing parties. 
3.  Marketisation of work and right-wing populist orientation 
Transitions towards right-wing populist orientations cannot only be found 
among particular social spheres. Topics with right-wing populist potential 
appear in the answers of integrated as well as of precarious or disaffiliated 
individuals; they are formulated across the entire typology of employment-
related (dis-)integration. This is important: neither unemployment nor pre-
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cariousness are exclusive explanatory factors. The same is true on fears of 
social decline and precariousness in the “zone of integration”. 
3.1 Employment and unemployment within the right-wing populist 
axiomatic
All the topics above cannot be explained just by referring to the work experi-
ences of the interviewees, who express views, attitudes and judgements 
which are persistent in situation-specific influences and experiences. One 
supports the prevention of immigration because s/he is living in a region with 
only very few foreigners. The perception that foreigners take jobs away from 
Germans is expressed by interviewees who consider their own job safe. The 
exclusion of “social parasites” is formulated by those who live in good eco-
nomic circumstances, and who do not compete for welfare state resources. 
Neither social position in the labour market nor work experiences are direct 
driving forces behind the right-wing populist axiomatic. These “bridges” to-
wards right-wing populism have their origin more in what Bourdieu identi-
fied as “systematic political conception”. These conceptions are relatively 
consistent schemes of interpretation, with which individuals perceive and de-
code their daily experiences at work and elsewhere.
Within the right-wing populist axiomatic, opinions and attitudes concern-
ing work and unemployment play an important role. The fact that dealing 
with competition in the labour market leads to particular nationalistic, ethni-
cal, racist and sexist classifications must neither be scandalised, nor treated as 
something pathological. The opposition of liberal universalism and national, 
ethnical or gender specific particularism is inherent in the world wide capital-
ist economy. Processes of economic globalisation corresponding with mar-
ket-liberal universalistic ideas go hand in hand with particular frames, whose 
function consists in legitimating placement of labour forces in certain posi-
tions in the hierarchy of employment society. From the perspective of the 
working population, this ideological ambiguity indicates a structural contra-
diction within the production regime of a capitalist market economy: “on the 
one hand working and living conditions are held in constant mobility and de-
stabilised in order to guarantee competition in the labour market and to con-
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stantly gather new labour forces from the ‘industrial reserve army’...; on the 
other hand labour forces are stabilised during long periods in order to ‘edu-
cate’ them for work and to ‘render them loyal’ to the enterprise” (Balibar 
1990: 256).
This structural contradiction achieves a new dynamic under a flexible and 
market-centred production regime (Dörre 2002). The strengthening of mar-
ket-oriented modes of governance and control of employment means that 
originally legitimate forms of labour division become more obsolete and fi-
nally replaced. Castel’s zone model marks the broad character of this new la-
bour division. The fight for inclusion in this new regime is only at first sight 
an “individualistic” matter. Individuals compete with each other in the labour 
market, but they undertake competition through real or imaginary group 
building. Individuals and groups react to disintegrative effects resulting from 
the erosion of formerly legitimate modes of labour division through interest-
motivated and symbolically conveyed strategies of integration. Nationalistic, 
xenophobic and racist classifications are attempts to get in touch with “in-
groups”, to strengthen the individual position in competition for material re-
sources and social recognition.
Imaginary modes of inclusion and exclusion are often based on elements 
of previous ideologies of integration which through “bricolage” (Lévi-
Strauss) are modified and adapted to new circumstances. Nationalism repre-
sents a modern type of integration whose aim has always been to weaken the 
antagonistic potential of employment-related social conflicts. Modern capital-
ist societies, as noted by Etienne Balibar (1990: 259), “reproduce a regressive 
image of the nation-state” where “people are ‘at home’ because they are 
among themselves”. This is because of processes of economic internationali-
sation. Balibar underestimates the impact of welfare state-capitalism. During 
the “golden era” of Rhine capitalism, ideologies of social partnership could 
operate with a universalistic “language”, because they corresponded with 
work experiences of the large majority of employees. From the perspective of 
the full-time employees and their families, the expanding welfare state saw 
relative decoupling of the labour force from market risks. Participation of the 
work force in productivity gains, mass consumption, statutory industrial 
rights such as co-determination and the expansion of social security systems 
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became the foundations of a welfare state consciousness, which corresponded 
to a type of capitalism (Albert 1992; Streeck 1997) which proved extremely 
cohesive.
The ongoing crisis of this type of society now means that a nationally ori-
ented welfare state consciousness might be transformed into a regressive 
modernistic ideology of exclusion, in “reactive nationalism” (Dörre 2003).  
At the centre of reactive nationalism is “Germany as an island of prosper-
ity”, to be protected against foreign, illegitimate requests. To prevent having 
to share the “cake” with too many, entry to this “island” should be more dif-
ficult and severely controlled. Frequently stated criteria of exclusion are 
(economic) “utilisation” and “culture”. Such criteria can be used flexibly. Re-
active nationalism of employees, and of old and new employers, does not 
primarily refer to nationalistic ideas and symbols, but to an understanding of 
national identity which legitimises social and civic rights. It cannot be gener-
alised as a pre-modern, or a new, variant of a fascist blood-and-soil ideology. 
A politically delicate feature of this ideology is that it differs only slightly 
from recent welfare state consciousness. Reactive nationalism in the 21st cen-
tury safeguards crucial elements of social partnership ideologies; it has a 
partly well-developed sense of social injustice. It deplores unjust distribution 
and insists on a “fair exchange”, of a balanced give-and-take situation (“good 
money for good work”), the basis for the relationship between work force and 
management, between capital and labour. The classification system changes 
when the German “island of prosperity” is related to other competing nation 
states. Conflicts for just distribution between “below” and “above” are rein-
terpreted as conflicts between cultures and nation-states. The reactive nation-
alism of employees is a specific, social populist answer to unlimited marketi-
sation. Where the former connection between the nation-state and social-
reformist policy is obsolete, the integrative power of employment is reduced, 
and the ideology of globalism is the driving force for social insecurity, the 
policy of borders represents an imaginary way out.  
Reactive nationalism is one possible manifestation of the political axio-
matic of right-wing populism. Other manifestations are possible. They pos-
sess autonomy with regard to concrete experiences; in everyday life they are 
enriched by concrete experiences, and de- and re-constructed.  
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3.2 Division of labour, work experience and right-wing populist  
orientations
Connections between a market-oriented mode of control, work experience 
and right-wing populist orientations, can be illustrated. We discuss three 
relevant fields. 
Table 3 
(1) Negative flexibilisation without political representation 
(2) ”De-womanisation“ and ”forced feminisation“ 
(3) Contested hierarchies in disciplined production communities 
(1) Negative flexibilisation without political representation 
Employees with transitions towards right-wing populist orientations perceive 
market-oriented flexibilisation of employment relations and work modes as 
an external constraint, affecting living and working conditions negatively. 
Employees perceive themselves as confronted with increasing cost and pro-
ductivity pressure; those in lower and middle management positions see this 
as a particular burden. Many suggest increasing pressure of flexibility and 
performance, which contradicts public discourse on savings and flexibility. A 
foreman in the construction industry in eastern Germany illustrates this: 
Q: “What is your opinion about the political suggestion of fighting unem-
ployment by more flexible work?” 
A: “We are completely flexible at work. We don’t speak about flexibility 
at work. If the company says ‘you have to go there for work’ then we go 
there. We never discuss that. (...) Our guys even go to Antwerp, to Italy or 
to western German regions. We are highly flexible.” 
Real requirements at work, and public discourse on flexibility, have little in 
common. The hardship of the “real working life” has no voice in politics. La-
bour market reforms represent an additional pressure on traditional perform-
ers in society. The same foreman: “I don’t know why these measures always 
refer to little people. (...) Those who take these decisions have to be shot 
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down. They push people into poverty. These can only be ideas by people liv-
ing high.” 
In the eyes of many, there is injustice concerning work-related risks and 
inconveniences. This feeling can be found among employees without any 
right-wing populist tendencies. In the group of right-wing populists we ob-
serve a particular aspect. The injustice in the relationship between “above” 
and “below” is considered unchangeable, because “politics” produces this in-
justice. The political system and its representatives are incapable of solving 
this fundamental problem of justice. The stronger the feeling of powerless-
ness, the stronger the inclination to ask for authoritarian solutions, even at the 
expense of scapegoats.
(2) “De-womanisation” and “forced feminisation” 
Market-oriented flexibilisation has consequences for gender specific modes 
of labour division and corresponding identities. For a long time precarious 
work (“bad jobs”) represented the traditional form of employment for 
women. Full-time “normal employment” has been a male domain. Most 
housewives and mothers could not have a full-time job. Their decision for an 
atypical and potentially precarious job led to a labour market for women, a 
reservoir for non-normal-employment, traditionally the “helping family 
member” (Mayer-Ahuja 2003). In a dynamic and highly regulated labour 
market, many women, as “additional earners”, had no problems with accept-
ing insecure jobs with low salaries. In the course of a decreasing employment 
dynamic, contemporary modes of precarious jobs could spread. The tradi-
tional gender specific division of labour suggested a “voluntary” decision for 
such jobs, and atypical employment has become primarily a female domain. 
Our type 7 “the content ones” results from this development. Identification 
with the role as a housewife and mother makes precarious jobs necessary but 
convenient. This is “secondary integration potential”.  
Non-voluntary flexibilisation influences the secondary integration poten-
tial of the “additional earner”. A retail saleswoman locates her job at the 
lower end of the social scale. She works for financial reasons, but obtains her 
satisfaction from her roles as housewife and mother. Her “dream” is to 
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choose her working time to fulfil these roles. This dream does not come true: 
“The best situation for me would have been to work three days one quarter 
and the other three days three quarters. This was my big wish because in this 
case I would have been at home for my children three days a week.” 
The employee suffers from short periods of planning. Her working times 
are fixed at earliest six weeks in advance. It undermines social identity, capa-
ble under normal circumstances of minimising the precarious character of the 
employment. Chaotic and unpredictable working times prove incompatible 
with the role of the caring housewife and mother. The interviewee sees her-
self as “de-womanised”. This makes her angry towards all those capable of 
living this “dream” without any effort: “Shall I tell you something. I hate this. 
I’m not hostile towards foreigners, don’t get me wrong. But it makes me 
really angry. They have their six, seven children, they can stay at home sit-
ting on their arses, and poor sods like me have to work. They get enough 
money from us. These are things that I find really disgusting.” 
Beside “de-womanisation” we have identified “forced-feminisation”. An 
eastern German production worker in the automobile industry worked as a 
construction worker and then as a temporary worker. Despite now being in 
permanent, well paid employment, he is unsatisfied with his position as an 
assembly worker. He describes his current situation as follows: “The job ren-
ders you effeminate. You long for something bigger, something where you 
see what you produce.” 
This employee has a job which in his eyes is a female job. He cannot be 
proud of it, and feels feminised. The implicit feeling of “forced-feminisation” 
was even stronger during the time he worked on a temporary basis, because 
he could not play the traditional role of the male bread winner. He was in 
constant fear of losing his job. This has changed. He is now able to plan, save 
money and have a social life. He nevertheless suffers from lacking recogni-
tion. As a “feminised” assembly worker he sees himself confronted with lack 
of respect by “foreigners”. He does not dislike foreigners as a whole, “work-
ing foreigners like Turks and Russians are all right”, but he does not want 
those in Germany “who come here and are just begging for money”. It is not 
direct competition on the labour market that annoys this assembly worker 
most, but the lack of respect. Despite a permanent contract, he sees the dan-
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ger of becoming “effeminate”. At first sight, dominant male behaviour from 
foreigners is an insult for him. Lacking recognition creates hatred against 
outsiders who, as non-Germans, are capable of “having a life” and symboli-
cally occupy the field of demonstrative masculinity. Overlapping gender-
specific and ethnical dimensions sensitise him for messages of right-wing 
parties. “These parties handle topics which encourage people”.  
“De-womanisation” and “forced-feminisation” stand for another connec-
tion between work experiences and right-wing populist orientations. Where 
the constraints of market-driven flexibilisation and the corresponding 
changes of the gender-specific division of labour undermine the secondary 
integration potential of typical male and female expectations, the employees 
react by defending their traditional identity. They stick to their life concepts 
in an imaginary way, and they defend them against disrespectful behaviour 
from outsiders, capable of living their life concepts without making a contri-
bution.
(3) Contested hierarchies in disciplined production communities 
Generally relationships between core workers and temporary workers are un-
problematic. Interviews in the car assembly plant show occasional conflicts. 
If these conflicts take place between foreign core workers and German tem-
porary workers, they obtain an ethnical or nationalistic character. An inter-
view partner (former temporary worker) told us about frictions with Croatian 
workers which culminated in a murder threat. Such conflicts are typically 
kept hidden, because those involved have to face the possibility of dismissal. 
In multinational production communities of Transnational Corporations, eth-
nically motivated or racial conflicts are dysfunctional. Management and em-
ployee representatives will do everything to inhibit them. The reasons for 
xenophobic, racial classification are not eliminated. The division into core 
and temporary workers encourages the construction of imaginary groups, 
which are used as a means in the fight for a good position at work. For many 
it is certain that “any foreigner lives better and is better treated”. It is then as-
sumed that “if these people weren’t there, then maybe we would have a better 
life”. Against this background the severe anti-discrimination regime of the 
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company appears as pure repression. A former temporary worker tells us, 
“The company says that discrimination must not take place. If I should say 
something like ‘you stupid Russian’ then I lose my job. If the Russian says 
‘you stupid German’ then it is no problem”. According to this employee the 
personnel department says “no xenophobia in our enterprise”. “But most of 
the German core workers think that all foreigners should go home”. No one 
says this at work, because otherwise he or she would get dismissed immedi-
ately. The quoted employee feels “oppressed in his liberty of opinion”. In his 
eyes “foreigners are in any case better protected”. Within the company it is 
even forbidden to say “I’m proud to be a German. If you do so you are im-
mediately labelled as a right-wing extremist”.  
The anti-racist policy of the company and works council has no success, be-
cause it proves unable to inhibit positional fights within the company. The 
German temporary workers consider the foreign permanent workers “only as 
tolerated guests”. Not despite, but because of, the company’s anti-racist pol-
icy, the belief forms that “the foreigners are better off than we are”. Within 
the company this opinion has no legitimate expression; it is a taboo. The re-
sentments grow secretly. A mode of double reality develops. With regard to 
the team and the work situation itself, one observes behaviour which respects 
the company’s policy. Under the cloak of political correctness, xenophobic 
and openly racist classifications develop. Their secret and informal diffusion 
has the character of subversive action, against “arrogant foreigners”, and 
against “those on top” who enforce their foreigner friendly policy.  
4.  Conclusion  
We summarise these findings for research on right-wing populism. Our hy-
pothesis assumes an connection between transformations of work, precari-
ousness and new right-wing populism. 
4.1 “Populist moment” and the right-wing populist axiomatic 
Those describing the formation of new right-wing populism in Europe 
(Decker 2004; Heitmeyer/Loch 2001; Bischoff et al. 2005) assume move-
ments and parties rooted in the transformations of welfare state-capitalisms 
 The Increasing Precariousness of the Employment Society 117
since the 1980s. New right-wing populism is a different phenomenon from 
traditional right-wing extremism. By focusing on ideology, one can define 
new right-wing populism as a basically individualistic concept which empha-
sises the social duties of each person, but rejects bureaucratic paternalism and 
collectively imposed solidarity. New right-wing populism is neither charac-
terised by submissive respect towards élites, nor by sympathy with under-
privileged groups (Lasch 1995). When trying to bring into balance individual 
freedom and social commitment, populists are “pioneers of ambiguity” 
(Decker 2004: 30; Kann 1983: 371).  
The ideological nucleus of right-wing populism is “ethnic-pluralism” or 
“differential racism” or “racism without races” (Decker 2004; Taguieff 1991; 
Balibar 1993; Dörre 1997) which represents the constructs of a new intellec-
tual right (Benthin 2004). The parallels with patterns of everyday conscious-
ness, which we define as right-wing populist axiomatic, seem striking. This is 
an “everyday philosophy” of social currents, which reacts to “de-
collectivisation” in a collective manner by mobilising resentments. Xenopho-
bic or even racist classifications are at the heart of this right-wing populist 
axiomatic, which originates in the discrepancy between official discourse 
about flexibility and real or anticipated experiences of precariousness. Indi-
viduals perceive themselves as objects of market-driven flexibilisation, acting 
in response to withdrawal of social security. As Robert Castel argues, it 
seems only possible to withdraw from “the game of change, mobility, con-
stant adaptation and re-qualification” at the expense of “social death” (2005: 
71). The more the gap between the official mode of treating this problem and 
everyday experiences grows, the more likely is a “populist moment” de-
scribed by Goodwyn (1978) in his classical study of the “Agrarian Revolt in 
America”. We disagree with Castel: not only so called losers of modernity 
suffer from that development. It can also be a reaction to the rise of the “dan-
gerous classes” (2005: 74), whose moral condemnations refer at least partly 
to “hard facts” (ibid.: 77f.). 
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4.2 “Rebellious”, “conserving” and “conformist” right-wing populism 
We differentiate three transitions towards right-wing populism, which do not 
directly correspond with the “zones” of the employment society, but possess 
“zone specificity”. We distinguish a “conformist”, “conserving” and rather 
“rebellious” variant. 
The rebellious variant can mostly be found in the “zone of disaffiliation” 
and the “zone of precariousness” (type 6, 8, 9). It has its origins in the disag-
gregation of formerly coherent, rational political orientations. This has to do 
with what Bourdieu (2000) has seen as the characteristic of subproletarian ex-
istences. A life completely characterised by provisional arrangements leads to 
the “systematic disorganisation of behaviour, attitudes and ideologies”. The 
longer this lasts, the more likely it becomes to stop unpleasant work and to 
obtain money with least effort. “Unemployment and fixed-term work make 
an end to traditions and disallow at the same time the concept of a rational 
living” (ibid.: 107ff.). In the same way, political orientations appear foggy 
and inconsistent. The disaffiliated and precarious workers dither between res-
ignation and imaginary revolt, a revolt which keeps to modes of protest im-
posed by the established political system. Their protest seems disorientated; it 
refers similarly to “those above”, to everything “foreign” or “different”. It re-
fers to the political class as a whole. The oscillation between resignation and 
demonstrative expression of misery follows an affective quasi-systema-
tisation based on a closed world view and emotive positions. 
The political orientations of rebellious right-wing populists seem contra-
dictory and confusing. The statements are governed by an emotionally 
grounded system of classification. The emotionally negatively loaded con-
cepts of the enemy such as “the others” or “the foreigners” have the primary 
function of constructing positively loaded affiliations through explicit demar-
cation. In the case of young unemployed Turks, this identity politics has quite 
grotesque characteristics. Migrants of the second generation pretend to be 
“Hitler fans”, although they are aware that they would be the first persecuted 
by a new Hitler. Stereotypes, such as that Hitler did much to address the un-
employment situation, are nothing more than symbolic affiliation to the rea-
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soning of the autochthonous majority in their social world. It serves as le-
gitimisation for defiant insistence on their own nationality (“I am Turkish”) 
which represents a shield against negatively loaded classifications by others.
The “conserving” variant can be found among formally integrated em-
ployees confronted with the possibility and/or fear of social falling (type 3, 
4). They defend their own social position by using resentment as a driving 
force for “social and political action” (Castel 2005: 67f.). They use resent-
ment in competition with others for resources and social status. Their argu-
mentation is rather “rationalistic”: when arguing about distributive matters 
they distinguish between “above” and “below”; their positions are compatible 
with a trade union policy and collective representation. We find active trade 
union and works council members among them. Their main concern is to pre-
serve welfare state-capitalism, including its security promises, by limiting the 
number of “insiders” according to “ethnic”, “national” or “cultural” criteria. 
Disregarding individual convictions and systems of classifications, inter-
viewees agree that migration leads to unemployment, costs a lot and reduces 
the quality of life of German citizens. In additiont, the trade union members 
among this group whose political orientations are grounded on solidarity 
(Schumann 2003) fear that this is endangered by ethnic or national heteroge-
neity. This becomes obvious by referring to German miners: Turkish miners 
talking Turkish with each other endanger cohesion in the eyes of their Ger-
man colleagues. A feeling of cultural inferiority (Turks understand German 
but Germans do not understand Turkish) goes with the claim for a workers’ 
solidarity which can be used at any time in a manner which excludes the for-
eign “disturbers”. “Conserving” right-wing populism does not imply loyalty 
to a specific political party. Among concerned employees we find diehards as 
well as former social democrats. They react in a “conserving” manner to pre-
serve the advantages of the former “Bonn Republic” with the help of a strict 
migration policy. It is a variant of welfare state consciousness with origins in 
the era of expanding Fordism and employment. The excluding mechanisms 
of this type of consciousness become visible under changed conditions. We 
see this variant as a mode of “reactive nationalism”, with a rudimentary 
“class instinct”, consisting of a mixture of envy and disdain, “which is 
grounded on differences between social positions, and where those being 
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situated just below or just above the observer’s own position of the social 
ladder are held responsible for the latter’s misery” (Castel 2005: 68).  
The “rebellious” and “conserving” variants have to be distinguished from 
“conformist” right-wing populism. This can be found in the “zone of integra-
tion” (type 1, 2), mainly among interviewees who have “executing” tasks. 
We speak of a “conformist” variant, because it relies on over-adaptation to 
hegemonist norms, and on an affirmative position with respect to the market-
centred transformation of the German social and economic model. In the IT 
department of a large bank, we spoke to employees who represent an exclud-
ing concept of integration although they are highly integrated at work. These 
employees define the team in which they work, their colleagues and also the 
nation, as a community of hard working people. Those who do not meet the 
performance standards of this community are excluded from integration. This 
concept of integration is highly problematic as it implies a polarised view of 
an in- and out-group, stigmatising the latter. Exemplary stigmatising topics 
are the multicultural society, ethnic minorities, green-card or unemployment. 
The conformists expect from others what they expect from themselves: the 
absolute fulfilment of performance norms. The integration of foreigners 
should be a one-way adaptation to the “German culture” of the hard working 
population. They complain about lacking justice, and where they can under-
stand right-wing populist reasoning at least “a little bit”. These persons could 
be described as “prosperity-chauvinist” winners of modernisation, or as 
“Standort”-nationalists. This is insufficient. The conformists understand inte-
gration in direct confrontation with the work sphere, which relies on over-
adaptation to existing performance norms. This concept of integration is not 
as solid as it seems. Negative experiences at work, as a consequence of per-
manent restructuring or even job loss, lead to implicit questioning of these 
performance norms. While the pressure at work of the conformists is con-
stantly rising, the guarantee that their performance is leading to the desired 
results is decreasing. With increasing pressure for adaptation and perform-
ance, and a strict fulfilment of performance norms, conformists expect the 
same from any other person. For interviewees, striving for complete integra-
tion at work (work orientation) has the function of a normative frame of ref-
erence which they use to judge social problems (political consciousness). The 
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integration of foreigners is thus only conceivable as assimilation, as a com-
plete adaptation. Those who do not meet this understanding of integration 
fear being labelled as not-adaptable, or bound to be excluded. 
The “conformist” variant shows that transitions towards right-wing popu-
list orientations must not be understood as equivalent to the perceived degree 
of social disintegration, but a consequence of over-adaptation to social 
norms. These norms might constitute an understanding of integration which 
structures experiences and judgements in highly qualified knowledge work.  
4.3 Explanations: Deprivation or culture of dominance?  
Our study proves the existence of right-wing populist potential, which cannot 
be sufficiently grasped by referring to classic items of right-wing extremist 
research. Right-wing populism comprises a xenophobic, rather “neo-racist” 
(Castels 1991: 97ff.; Miles 1991; Taguieff 1991: 221 ff.) dimension. Repre-
sentatives of the right-wing populist axiomatic act in very different ways, as 
an “undercurrent” (Birsl/Lösche 2001) in democratic organisations and par-
ties. Contrary to other European democracies (Kitschelt/McGann 1997, 
Mény/Surel 2002, Werz 2003), there has been no right-wing populist break-
through at a party political level, at least at federal level. All the attempts of 
right-wing extremist organisations such as the NPD, the DVU or the Repub-
licans to disguise themselves as populists have been short episodes. The rea-
son for this is specifically German: as soon as the extremist dimension of a 
party becomes apparent, corresponding with no credible rejection of national-
socialism, right-wing organisations have no real chances to act as right-wing 
populist parties (Decker 2004: 156ff.). This is why the right-wing populist 
axiomatic repeatedly wrangles with the “historical burden”, desperately try-
ing to get rid of it.
Right-wing populism relates to different, partly contradictory motives and 
interests. When referring to theoretical explanations, the supposedly irrecon-
cilable polarisation between deprivation approaches favoured by Castel, and 
culture of dominance approaches (Rommelspacher 1995, Held et al. 1991) 
which take a clear distance from so-called “deficit theories”, might only refer 
to different empirical phenomena. The culture of dominance-approach as-
122 Klaus Dörre, Klaus Kraemer, Frederic Speidel 
sumes that individuals who “identify with the dominating values of money, 
professional career and success” and who “glorify the principle of perform-
ance and reduce human relationships to their functionality for their own in-
terests” are susceptible to racist and authoritarian-nationalist attitudes (Rom-
melspacher 1995: 86). Therefore neo-racism is in its “systematic appearance 
mainly a problem concerning the established and those expected or expecting 
to belong to the establishment in the future – with all the necessary efforts” 
(ibid.).
In this diagnosis one can recognise elements of the “conformist” variant 
of right-wing populism. Even parallels to the old thesis on authoritarism de-
veloped by Fromm and Adorno can be seen. A closer look reveals doubts. Al-
though the authoritarian personality refers to a different social context, many 
of the interviewees do not seem to have a weak ego. Some of them have 
strong will-power. There seem to be mechanisms at their workplace which 
provoke the development of an excluding understanding of integration. Our 
empirical material furnishes new insights. In the higher spheres of the em-
ployment society, and in areas of modern participative work, there seems to 
be a connection between the increasing “marketisation” of work (Sauer 
2005), new modes of “self-governance” (Foucault 2000), and a type of self-
instrumentalisation which provokes sufferance and techniques of behaviour 
helping to overcome this pressure. Excluding concepts of integration is a 
product of such techniques of self-governance. Market-centred governance 
mechanisms generate “the coercion for self-coercion”, a mode of self-
labelling (Dörre/Röttger 2003; Dörre 2002) influencing the whole personal-
ity. Corresponding self-techniques efface the demarcation line between the 
work sphere and privacy, lead to the calculated use of emotions, generate 
restlessness and the inability to relax. Those who work and live like that are 
no modernity losers, and the term “relative deprivation” (Decker 2004: 27) 
does not relate to the phenomenon in question. They suffer from success and 
strive for professionalism. The total willingness to work hard is demanded, 
and at the same time impossible, because it would negate the social constitu-
tion of the personality. Not only the negation of, but also the intention to ful-
fil, market mechanisms and flexibility pressures can lead to social death. If 
people are forced more and more to accept the laws of performance and pro-
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ductivity, aggression against unproductive, supposedly parasite groups is a 
logical consequence, although by no means inevitable. 
This is one of the possible transitions towards right-wing populist orienta-
tions where experiences with flexible work come into play. When theorists of 
culture of dominance like Rommelspacher (1995: 86) argue that “neo-racism 
is not an issue of the weakest” but consider “prosperity chauvinism” as the 
main reason for neo-racist classifications, they are unable to explain the “re-
bellious” and “conserving” variant of right-wing populism. Neither “rebels” 
in a precarious position, nor reactive nationalists among formally integrated 
employees, can be qualified as “prosperity chauvinists”. Both groups formu-
late legitimate expectations of a decent life, which in the labour market today 
become difficult to realise. Reactive nationalists are not only mere victims of 
restructuring. The fewer possibilities they see to improve their own situation 
through individual or collective efforts, the more they compete on the labour 
market with the means of resentment. It remains their decision . Those groups 
who embody obvious social falling become their main target.  
There are tensions between the sketched groups and political orientations. 
“Rebellious”, “conserving” and “conformist” right wing populism are hardly 
comparable. This is the structural difficulty with regard to mobilisation for 
right-wing populist formations. They have to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
They have to bring together the “conformist” market apologist in a high job 
position, suffering from self-oppression and the success criteria of the new 
market regime, and the “rebellious” interim worker seeking protection from 
the arbitrariness of this regime.  
We conclude that there is an interconnection between the increase in pre-
cariousness of work, the recurrence of social insecurity and the occurrence of 
right-wing populist orientations. This can only be negated when limiting the 
effect of increasing precariousness to the phenomenon of insecure employ-
ment. The “zones” of the employment society are related to each other like a 
system of communicating tubes. The fear of social falling of formally inte-
grated groups is a crucial characteristic of precariousness, and the disciplin-
ing pressure triggered by disaffiliated and precarious workers constitutes the 
pathological dimension of contemporary modes of work. The less employees 
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can overcome this situation, the greater the tendency to deal with status com-
petition by using resentment, or xenophobic or neo-racist classifications.  
This right-wing populism in everyday life is only a virulent danger if it 
correlates with a crisis in political representation. People acting according to 
the right-wing populist axiomatic are not right-wing extremists yet! They act 
in accordance with the dominant ideology offers of society. The implicit ac-
ceptance of democratic parties, and even trade unions, to encourage ”Stan-
dort”-policies on a national level, subordinating social interests to the impera-
tives of economic performance, produces the frame of reference for modes of 
“self-governance” which become existential under the circumstances of 
flexible work. If a political system ignores the social consequences and divi-
sions created by such “self-governance”, political formations may fill the 
gaps.
A crisis of political representation is visible in Germany. The continuous 
ascent of a new Arturo Ui will not take place, because extreme xenophobia, 
characteristic of all right-wing populist formations, collides with the interests 
of the economic elite. Xenophobia and the creation of nationalist orientations 
are incompatible with the goals of a “transnational class” participating in 
globalisation and Europeanisation. This is no reason for complacency. The 
function of organised right-wing populism consists in Germany, of creating 
space for a right-wing populist undercurrent within democratic parties and 
trade unions, with regard to topics like migration or policies against criminal-
ity or terrorism. Democratic organisations which do not confront such an un-
dercurrent will, in the context of current challenges like EU-enlargement, 
Turkish membership of the EU etc. lose the capacity to act strategically. An 
effective political confrontation has to uncover the “substance” of right-wing 
populist ideologies. Because the right-wing formations are “everything but a 
phenomenon of ‘backwardness’ in a process of civilisation of societies” 
(Klönne 2002: 1, 4), they become a mass phenomenon only where they pre-
sent themselves as a rationalist organisation of collective “interest representa-
tion”. The democratic treatment of new and old social questions, as well as 
migration and cultural integration, are decisive for the future of right-wing 
populism and democracy. If active treatment of these issues fails, the danger 
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of “authoritarian capitalism” (Heitmeyer 2001), even in Europe, becomes 
virulent.
References
Adorno, Th. W. et al. (1973, Original 1950): The Authoritarian Personality, New York. 
Albert, M. (1992): Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus, Frankfurt/M. 
Baethge et al. (1989): Jugend: Arbeit und Identität. Opladen.
Baethge, M. et al. (2005): Berichterstattung zur sozioökonomischen Entwicklung in 
Deutschland. Arbeit und Lebensweisen. Erster Bericht. Wiesbaden. 
Balibar, E. (1990): Der „Klassen-Rassismus“. In: Balibar, E./Wallerstein, I., a.a.O.: 247-
260.
Balibar, E. (1993): Die Grenzen der Demokratie, Hamburg. 
Balibar, E. (2001): Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Le Frontières, l’État, le Peuple, Paris. 
Balibar, E./Wallerstein, I. (1990): Rasse, Klasse, Nation. Ambivalente Identitäten, Ham-
burg.
Benthin, R. (2004): Auf dem Weg in die Mitte. Öffentlichkeitsstrategien der Neuen Rech-
ten. Frankfurt/M. 
Bielefeld, U. (Hrsg.) (1991): Das eigene und das Fremde. Neuer Rassismus in der alten 
Welt. Hamburg. 
Bischoff, J. u. a.: Moderner Rechtspopulismus. Ursachen, Wirkungen, Gegenstrategien. 
Hamburg 2004. 
Boltanski, L./Chiapello, È. (2003): Der neue Geist des Kapitalismus. Konstanz. Frz. 
(1999): Le nouvel Ésprit du Capitalisme. Paris. 
Bourdieu, P. (1988): Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft. 
Frankfurt/M. 2. Aufl. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998): Prekarität ist überall. In: Bourdieu, P., a.a.O.: 96-102. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998): Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die 
neoliberale Invasion. Konstanz.
Bourdieu, P. (2000) Die zwei Gesichter der Arbeit. Konstanz. 
Brinkmann, U./Dörre, K./Röbenack, S. (2005): Prekäre Arbeit. Ursachen, Ausmaß, soziale 
Folgen und politische Verarbeitungsformen unsicherer Beschäftigungsverhältnisse. 
Eine Expertise. MS. Jena. 
Birsl, U./Lösche, P. (2001): (Neo-)Populismus in der deutschen Parteienlandschaft. Oder: 
Erosion der politischen Mitte In: Heitmeyer, U./Loch, D. (Hrsg.), a.a.O.: 346-380.
Bröckling, U./Krasmann, S./Lemke, Th. (Hrsg.) (2000): Gouvernementalität der Gegen-
wart. Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen, Frankfurt/M. 
Castel, R. (2000): Die Metamorphosen der sozialen Frage. Eine Chronik der Lohnarbeit, 
Konstanz.
Castel, R. (2005): Die Stärkung des Sozialen. Leben im neuen Wohlfahrtsstaat. Hamburg. 
Castles, St. (1991): Weltweite Arbeitsmigration, Neorassismus und der Niedergang des 
Nationalstaates. In: Bielefeld, U., a.a.O.: 129-158. 
Crouch, C./Streeck, W. (Eds.) (1997): Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping 
Convergence & Diversity, London. 
126 Klaus Dörre, Klaus Kraemer, Frederic Speidel 
Decker, F.: Der neue Rechtspopulismus. Opladen. 2. Aufl. 2004. 
Dörre, K. (1995): Junge GewerkschafterInnen. Vom Klassenindividuum zum Aktivbür-
ger? Münster.  
Dörre, K. (1997): Modernisierung der Ökonomie – Ethnisierung der Arbeit: Ein Versuch ü-
ber Arbeitsteilung, Anomie und deren Bedeutung für interkulturelle Konflikte. In: Heit-
meyer, W. (Hrsg.): Was treibt die Gesellschaft auseinander? Frankfurt/M.:69-117.  
Dörre, K. (2002): Kampf um Beteiligung. Arbeit, Partizipation und industrielle Beziehun-
gen im flexiblen Kapitalismus. Wiesbaden. 
Dörre, K. (2003): Rechte Orientierungen unter Lohnabhängigen. Ursachen, Auswirkun-
gen, Gegenstrategien. In: Demirovic, A./Beerhorst, J./Guggemos, M. (Hrsg.) (2004): 
Kritischer Theorie im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel. Frankfurt/M.: 289-317. 
Dörre, K./Röttger, B. (Hrsg.) (2003): Das neue Marktregime. Hamburg. 
Dörre, K./Kraemer, K./Speidel, F. (2005): Prekäre Beschäftigungsverhältnisse – Ursache 
von sozialer Desintegration und Rechtsextremismus? Endbericht. November 2005. 
Teilprojekt 2 im Forschungsverbund „Desintegrationsprozesse – Stärkung von Integra-
tionspotenzialen einer modernen Gesellschaft“. Ms: Jena/Recklinghausen. 
Fichter, M./Stöss, R./Zeuner, B. (2005): Ausgewählte Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts 
„Gewerkschaften und Rechtsextremismus“. MS. Berlin. 
Flecker, J. (2004): Die populistische Lücke: Umbrüche in der Arbeitswelt und ihre politi-
sche Verarbeitung. FORBA-Schriftenreihe 1/2004. Wien. 
Flecker, J./Hentges, G. (2004): Rechtspopulistische Konjunkturen in Europa – sozioöko-
nomischer Wandel und politische Orientierungen. In: Bischoff, J. et al., a.a.O.: 119-
149.
Flecker, J./Krenn, M. (2004): Abstiegsängste, verletztes Gerechtigkeitsempfinden und 
Ohnmachtsgefühle – zur Wahrnehmung und Verarbeitung zunehmender Unsicherheit 
und Ungleichheit in der Arbeitswelt. In: Zilian, H.G. (Hrsg.): Insider und Outsider. 
Mering.
Goodwyn, L. (1978): The Populist Moment in America. Oxford. 
Foucault, M. (2000): Die Gouvernementalität. In: Bröckling, U. et al., a.a.O. : 41-67. 
Hall, St. (1994): Rassismus und kulturelle Identität. Ausgewählte Schriften, Hamburg. 
Heitmeyer, W. (Hrsg.) (1994): Das Gewalt-Dilemma, Frankfurt/M. 
Heitmeyer, W. (Hrsg.) (1997): Was treibt die Gesellschaft auseinander? Frankfurt/M. 
Heitmeyer, W. (2001): Autoritärer Kapitalismus, Demokratieentleerung und Rechtspopulis-
mus. Eine Analyse von Entwicklungstendenzen. In: Loch, D./Heitmeyer, W., a.a.O.: 
497-534.
Heitmeyer, W. (2005): Deutsche Zustände, Folge 3. Frankfurt/M. 
Held, J./Horn, H.-W./Marvakis, A. (1996): Gespaltene Jugend. Politische Orientierungen 
jugendlicher Arbeitnehmer, Opladen. 
Hopf, W. (1999): Ethnozentrismus und Ökonomismus. Die ‚Leistungsgesellschaft‘ als 
Deutungsmuster für soziale Ausgrenzung. In: Prokla 102, 26(1): 107-130. 
Hopf, Ch. et al. (1995): Familie und Rechtsextremismus – Analyse qualitativer Interviews 
mit jungen Männern, Weinheim. 
Hyman, R. (2001): Globalisation, Shareholder Value And The ‘Re-Commodification’ of 
Labour: The End of ‘Social Partnership’. Paper to the conference on Shareholder Va-
lue and Globalization, Bad Homburg, 10-12 May 2001. 
 The Increasing Precariousness of the Employment Society 127
Kann, M. E. (1983): The New Populism an the New Marxism. In: Theory and Society, 12: 
365-373.
Kitschelt, H./McGann, J. (1995).: The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis. Ann Arbor. 
Kitschelt, H. (2001): Politische Konfliktlinien in westlichen Demokratien: Ethnisch kultu-
relle und wirtschaftliche Verteilungskonflikte In: Heitmeyer, U./Loch, D. (Hrsg.), 
a.a.O.: 418-442. 
Klönne, A. (2002) Thesen zum Rechtspopulismus. Frankfurt/M., MS. 
Kraemer, K./Speidel, F. (2004): Prekäre Leiharbeit. In: Vogel, B., a.a.O.: 119-153. 
Kronauer, M. (2002): Exklusion. Die Gefährdung des Sozialen im entwickelten Kapita-
lismus. Frankfurt/M. 
Loch, D./Heitmeyer, W. (Hrsg.) (2001): Schattenseiten der Globalisierung. Frankfurt/M. 
Lasch, Ch. (1995): Die blinde Elite. Macht ohne Verantwortung. Hamburg. 
Mayer-Ahuya, N. (2003): Wieder dienen lernen? Vom westdeutschen „Normalarbeitsver-
hältnis“ zu prekärer Beschäftigung seit 1973. Berlin. 
Mény, Y./Surel, Y. (Eds.) (2002): Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York. 
Miles, R. (1991): Rassismus. Einführung in die Geschichte und Theorie eines Begriffs. 
Hamburg.
Offe, C. (1984): ‚Arbeitsgesellschaft‘. Strukturprobleme und Zukunftsperspektiven. 
Frankfurt/M.
Paugam, S. (1998): Poverty an Social Exclusion: A Sociolocical View. In: Rhodes, M./ 
Mény, Y. (Eds.): The Future of European Welfare. A New Social Contract. London. 
Paugam, S. (2000): Le salarié de la précarité. Paris. 
Paugam, S. (2002): Social Precarity and Socical Integration. Report for the European 
Commission. Based on Eurobarometer 56.1. October 2002.
Priester, K. (2005): Der populistische Moment. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale 
Politik 3/05. Bonn: 301-310. 
Rommelspacher, B. (1995): Dominanzkultur. Texte zu Fremdheit und Macht. Berlin. 
Sauer, D. (2005): Arbeit unter (Markt-)Druck: Ist noch Raum für innovative Arbeitspoli-
tik? In: WSI-Mitteilungen, 58(4): 179-185. 
Schultheis, F./Schulz, K. (Hrsg.) 2005: Gesellschaft mit begrenzter Haftung. Zumutungen 
und Leiden im deutschen Alltag. Konstanz 
Schumann, M. (2003): Metamorphosen von Industriearbeit und Arbeiterbewusstsein. 
Hamburg.
Sennett, R. (1998): Der flexible Mensch. Die Kultur des neuen Kapitalismus, Hamburg.
Streeck, W. (1997): German Capitalism: Does it exist? Can it survive? In: Crouch, 
C./Streeck, W. (Eds.), a.a.O.: 33-54. 
Taggart, P.: Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics. In: Mény, Y./Surel, Y. 
(Eds.): Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York.: 62-80.
Taguieff , P. (1994): Sur la Nouvelle Droite. Paris. 
Vogel, B. (2004): Neue Ungleichheiten im Wohlfahrtsstaat. Die politische Ordnung so-
zialer Verwundbarkeit und prekären Wohlstands. In: Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 
50(1-2): 174-188. 
Werz, N.: Populismus. Populisten in Übersee und Europa. Opladen: Leske und Budrich 
2003.
128 Klaus Dörre, Klaus Kraemer, Frederic Speidel 
Vester, M. (2001): Wer sind heute die gefährlichen Klassen. In: Heitmeyer, U./Loch, D. 
(Hrsg.), a.a.O.: 298-345. 
Windolf, P. (Hrsg.) (2005): Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Pro-
duktionsregimen. Wiesbaden. 
Authors
Klaus Dörre, Prof. Dr., Professor at the Institute of Sociology, University 
of Jena. 
Kraemer, Klaus, Dr., researcher at research institute Arbeit, Bildung, Par-
tizipation (FIAB), Recklinghausen. 
Frederic Speidel, Dr., researcher at the headquarter of Trade Union IG 
Metall, Frankfurt. 
Contact
Prof. Dr. Klaus Dörre 
Institute for Sociology, University of Jena, Carl-Zeiß-Str. 2 
07743 Jena, Germany 
E-mail: klaus.doerre@uni-jena.de 
